Known impossibility results have shown that not announcing policy can never be an equilibrium in political contests. In this paper, two o¢ ce-motivated candidates might or might not announce policy. In the case of an announcement, the candidates cannot avoid a degree of noise in the voters'interpretation of their stated positions. In the case of silence, the voters use their prior beliefs. I show that these premises su¢ ce to overcome the impossibility results. Also, in equilibrium, ambiguity-averse candidates are more likely not to announce policy than candidates using expected utility. An ambiguity-averse candidate is interpreted as being concerned about an ongoing negative campaign against him. The aim of this campaign would be to induce the interpretations of the announcements most unfavorable to his electoral performance. The predictions of the model are consistent with data on U.S. Senate races.
Introduction
Not announcing a position on sensitive issues is a common practice of candidates across elections. In the presidential campaign of 2004, for instance, the phenomenon was so evident that the New York Times devoted a series of editorials to "the toughest challenges facing the country" that were either "being glossed over with one-liners" or "not being mentioned" by candidates. 1 The two most striking issues were the federal budget de…cit and agricultural subsidies.
In this paper, I address the following questions: Why are some important issues never discussed in an election? Why are some other, less-sensitive issues often discussed? In democracies, elections are the means by which citizens'preferences are translated into policy outcomes. Candidates'disregard of sensitive issues during political contests, then, undermines the e¢ cacy of democracy in achieving its main goal: being the government by the people. Furthermore, if the parties persist in disregarding certain issues over time, polities may enter into a "political trap" in which politicians continue to execute highly unpopular policies simply because the voters lack the chance to vote them out. For example, consider the candidates' failure to discuss the budget de…cit in the 2004 presidential campaign. Given this fact, to what extent does the current budget de…cit re ‡ect a popular choice, no matter how distorted? How large are the welfare losses from having a budget de…cit other than the socially desired one? How will society deal with the issue if the parties opt again not to discuss it in the next election? These rhetorical questions point out potentially deleterious e¤ects of political nonsalience. In this paper, by salience I mean the phenomenon that both candidates opt to announce a position, and by non-salience, I mean the phenomenon that at least one of the candidates in an election opts not to announce a position on some issue.
Several prominent scholars, including Downs (1957) , Shepsle (1972) , and Page (1976) , pointed out the relevance of this problem a long time ago. Yet, the candidates' incentives not to discuss relevant issues are not well understood. In fact, rational choice theory has provided strong negative results for this phenomenon. Recently, Berliant and Konishi (2005) proved that, under very mild assumptions, non-salience cannot happen in a robust equilibrium within the standard expected utility framework. In their model, two o¢ ce-motivated candidates may announce or not announce policy. The candidates are uncertain regarding the most preferred policy of the voters. If a candidate does not announce, the voters rank the candidate according to their prior beliefs regarding the policy he is likely to implement if he wins the election. In this setting, risk aversion on the part of the voters su¢ ces to guarantee that, in equilibrium, the candidates will always prefer to announce policy. The authors further suggest that robust non-salience may be obtained if one abandons the expected utility framework in favor of the ambiguity aversion framework.
The aim of this paper is to shed some light on the conditions under which o¢ ce-motivated candidates may have incentives not to announce positions. This paper shows that only minor modi…cations to the standard Downsian model are required to generate non-salience in equilibrium. I consider this a contribution to the literature on political ambiguity, since, to the best of my knowledge, there is no paper to date that generates ambiguity within a simple framework or without reverting to strong assumptions. In the next paragraphs, I discuss the assumptions made throughout.
The …rst premise is that I assume a one-dimensional polity, where two o¢ ce-motivated candidates know the distribution of voters'ideal points with certainty. Since my main objective is to show that, contrary to what previous impossibility results have suggested, non-salience can indeed be obtained in equilibrium, a one-dimensional proof makes the main point. In addition, for my results to be strong, I need to show that non-salience can be obtained even in the presence of Condorcet (or "unbeaten") points. Because multi-dimensional models usually present Condorcet cycles, even if I provided a multi-dimensional model, the most exigent test for the model would be to hold in the particular case of one dimension. Examples of one-dimensional models are abundant in the literature on spatial voting. See Osborne (2000) , Morelli (2004) , and, in the speci…c area of ambiguity in elections, see Aragones and Postlewaite (2000) .
The second, and most important premise, of my research is that the candidates cannot avoid a certain degree of noise in the voters' interpretation of their announcements. In the real world, I identify two main sources of noise in the interpretation of announcements. The …rst one is language, which is an ambiguous means of communication. The seminal work in this area was conducted by the semiotician Ferdinand Saussure (1986) , who investigated the miscommunication problems generated by language mainly by elaborating on the dichotomy signi…ed (signi…é) -signi…er (signi…ant). 2 The second source of noise is the intermediation of third parties between politicians and voters. An obvious example would be the mass media (see Ansolabehere et al. (1993) ). I refer to the voters' noisy signal of the announcement by a candidate as the interpretation (of the announcement).
On the one hand, if a candidate does not announce policy, the voters use their beliefs about the policy that he will implement if he wins the election. On the other hand, we assume that if a candidate does announce policy, he commits to implement the voters' interpretation of his announcement. Alternatively, I could assume that the voters expect the winner to implement a policy randomly drawn among all the possible interpretations of his announcement. 3 However, any (risk-averse) voter prefers the institutional arrangement in which the candidates must implement the interpretation of their announcements to the institutional arrangement in which the candidates must implement their announcement (or a policy randomly drawn among all the possible interpretations of his announcement). Since this preference is unanimous across voters, and only assumes risk aversion on their part and symmetry in the distribution of their noisy signals, it provides a strong argument in favor of our assumption.
The third premise is that, rather than maximizing the probability of winning, the candidates maximize their expected vote share. This assumption is common in the literature; for example, see Adams (1999) , Lin et al. (1999) , and Scho…eld (2007) . (For a discussion on the equivalence of the assumptions of maximizing the probability of winning and maximizing vote share with probabilistic voters, see Patty (2007) ). However, some scholars consider the maximization of probability of winning a more appropriate assumption than the maximization of vote share. In any case, I show in Section V that non-salience can also be generated in this model under the assumption that the candidates maximize the expected probability of winning.
The main result of my paper is that non-salience may occur in equilibrium, under certain values of the parameters, for any distribution of voters' ideal points. As a general principle, in order to generate non-salience, my model requires that we either (i) …x the mean of the voters' beliefs (regarding what policy the candidate will implement) and increase the noise that enters into the voters' interpretation of the announcements, or (ii) …x the magnitude of this noise and make the mean of the voters'beliefs close enough to the electoral center. The intuition for this result is that if the mean of the beliefs is close enough to the median ideal point, then not announcing policy gives the candidates a vote share close to the optimum in the absence of noise and, at the same time, gives them a means to circumvent the noise in their announcements.
The assumption that there are several possible interpretations of the candidates'announcements allows me to pursue the following natural extension of the model. A plausible concern of a candidate may be that some external agent, perhaps his opponent or the mass media, attempts to induce, among the several possible interpretations, one that is unfavorable to him. The reason that the candidates may fear that their opponents might attempt to manipulate the interpretations in an unfavorable manner is that elections are zero-sum games. The reason that they may have the same concern about the mass media is that the latter may have interests other than reporting facts objectively (see Ansolabehere et al., 1993) .
In particular, candidates may be concerned about "media bias." Whether or not such a bias exists is an empirical question, and there is no consensus in the literature on this issue. On the one hand, mass media experts have encountered empirical evidence that although people are convinced of the existence of media bias, there is no such bias (D'Alessio and Allen 2000, Shah et al. 1999, Robinson and Sheenan 1983) . It is important to note that this literature has encountered what it has termed the hostile media e¤ ect: although there is no media bias, individuals …rmly believe that such a bias exists and, furthermore, that its direction contradicts their viewpoints (Dalton et al., 1998 , Vallone et al., 1985 . On the other hand, a recent study by two economists (Groseclose and Milyo, 2005) …nds signi…cant evidence of media bias. Note that both bodies of literature support the idea that people in general may be concerned that the media might alter their messages in an unfavorable manner. Evidence that the hostile media e¤ect is also present among political candidates is seen in the following quotation, in which former presidential candidate Michael Dukakis explains his defeat in the 1988 election.
"I said in my acceptance speech at Atlanta that the 1988 election was not about ideology but about competence. I was wrong. It was about phraseology. It was about 10-second sound bites. And made-for-TV backdrops. And going negative. I made a lot of mistakes in the '88 campaign, but none was as damaging as my failure to understand this phenomenon, and the need to respond immediately and e¤ectively to distortions of one's record and one's positions." 4 I pursue an extension of the model that accounts for the phenomenon of hostile media e¤ect. This is done through abandoning the expected utility framework in favor of ambiguity aversion. Recall that, in the specialized literature, it is customary to see ambiguity-averse agents as acting as if "out there" there were a malevolent third party playing a zero-sum game against them . Accordingly, I assume that the candidates are ambiguity-averse, and interpret that each of them acts as if there were a malevolent in ‡uence, presumably his opponent or the mass media, playing against him by inducing an unfavorable interpretation of their announcements.
I refer to two groups of papers to help describe where my model …ts in the literature. The …rst group addresses the problem of electoral ambiguity, rather than salience strictly speaking, because candidates are allowed to announce lotteries. 5 Hence, this body of literature explains why candidates may prefer to announce many (instead of any) positions on certain issues. Shepsle (1972) , the seminal paper within this group, …nds that in order to obtain ambiguity in equilibrium, voters need to be risk lovers. Since the assumption of risk-loving voters is controversial, this result has motivated further research by social choice scholars. As Alesina and Cukierman (1990) also include a noise term in their model, I wish to make clear that their model is very di¤erent from mine. In particular, in their model, a necessary condition to obtain ambiguity in equilibrium is that candidates have policy preferences. In my model, candidates are strictly o¢ ce-motivated. Another necessary condition in their model is that candidates aim to run for re-election. Because my model is static, re-electoral concerns are implausible. Also, in their model, candidates can choose the magnitude of noise, and, in equilibrium, this magnitude is set at levels higher than zero. In my model, if candidates could choose the magnitude of noise in the interpretation of their announcements, they would set it at zero (assuming risk-averse voters). In Aragones and Neeman (2000) , the candidates are assumed to (i) have preferences over policy, (ii) be unable to implement their promises, and (iii) be concerned about their probability of re-election. They show that for su¢ ciently large degrees of uncertainty on the part of the candidates regarding the distribution of voters' ideal points, ambiguity occurs in equilibrium. As in Alesina and Cukierman (1990) , in Aragones and Neeman (2000) , electoral ambiguity decreases the candidates'probability of winning o¢ ce, and it is driven by the assumption that candidates care about policy. Aragones and Postlewaite (2002) assume that the candidates care only about o¢ ce; however, in their setting, candidates cannot guarantee voters that they will honor their promises.
The second group of papers addresses the problem of salience, strictly speaking. Instead of allowing the candidates to announce any possible lottery, this group of papers gives the candidates the option of not announcing any position. Therefore, candidates can announce any position in the policy space or not announce a position at all. Following the Downsian setting, candidates commit to implement their promises if any was made; otherwise, voters'use their beliefs regarding the policy that a winner who did not announce policy will implement. Berliant and Konishi (2005) add uncertainty on the part of the candidates regarding the distribution of voters' most preferred policies, and prove that non-salience can never be a robust equilibrium. Since, in their model, it is just assumed that candidates are expected utility maximizers and that voters are risk-neutral or riskaverse, their impossibility results constitute a substantial challenge to the literature. Although they assume that candidates maximize the probability of winning, their results also hold when candidates maximize vote share. The key to their results is that elections are zero-sum games, which is true under both premises. 6 Berliant and Konishi (2005) seemingly contradict Glazer (1999) , who o¤ers an informal model in which candidates prefer not to announce policy. However, this contradiction is resolved when one makes explicit the implicit assumption in Glazer (1999) that the candidates do not know the mean of the voters'beliefs regarding the policy that a winner who did not announce policy will implement. The main problem with this assumption is that it violates the standard game theoretic postulate that the structure of the game is common knowledge (Aumann, 1976) . Berliant and Konishi (2005) suggest 5 In this paper, I use both the terms electoral ambiguity and ambiguity aversion. The reader must be aware that these are very di¤erent concepts that should not be confused. 6 A formal proof of this point follows readily from both Proposition 8 and Proposition 13 in the main body of this paper.
that ambiguity aversion may be necessary to generate an equilibrium where at least some candidate does not announce a position. My model distances itself from theirs in that it generates such an equilibrium even within expected utility (that is, without having to assume ambiguity aversion). Aragones et al. (2007) study a repeated election model in which strictly policy-motivated candidates have the option of not announcing policy. However, their focus is not on generating non-salience, but in analyzing equilibria in which the voters threaten to punish candidates who renege on their campaign promises and in which all campaign promises are believed by voters and honored by candidates. Hence, previous results in the literature have generated ambiguity by assuming: risk-loving voters (Shepsle, 1972) , absence of common knowledge (Glazer, 1990) , and inability of the candidates to commit to implement their promises (Aragones and Postlewaite, 2002) . My results are encouraging, since the model generates both partial non-salience and non-salience by slightly deviating from the standard Downsian setting. It su¢ ces to assume that the interpretation of announcements depends on the state of the world.
Finally, three papers that do not address the problem of salience or ambiguity but that are, nonetheless, related to my paper are Ghirardato and Katz (2002) , Ashworth (2007 ) and, especially, Bade (2003 . These three papers, as well as Berliant and Konishi (2005) , share the common feature with my paper of introducing ambiguity aversion in the study of elections. Ghirardato and Katz (2002) and Ashworth (2007) introduce ambiguity aversion to address the issue of voter turnout. Bade (2003) introduces ambiguity aversion à la Gilboa-Schmeidler to generate equilibrium in multidimensional political contests.
A direct implication of the propositions obtained in this paper is that non-salience (at least one candidate opts not to announce a position) can be obtained in equilibrium if the mean of the voters' beliefs is close enough to the Condorcet winner in the standard Downsian game. The intuition for this result is as follows. Assume that candidate, say 1, does not announce a position. Candidate 2's opportunity cost of responding with a no-announcement increases with the distance between the voters'beliefs (about the policy that a candidate who won without announcing policy will implement) and the Condorcet winner. To see this, note that given the spatial nature of the game, the less centrist the voters believe candidate 1's implemented policy will be, the larger the vote share candidate 2 could achieve by implementing a response which is epsilon away from candidate 1's implicit policy position. Being epsilon closer to the Condorcet winner, candidate 2's announcement could restrict candidate 1's appeal to the disa¤ected voters in an extreme of the voters'distribution, irrespective of the state of the world. Therefore, there must be a point such that if the distance between the voters' beliefs and the Condorcet winner is smaller than the distance between that point and the Condorcet winner, the cost of alienating some voters is smaller than the "cost" of announcing a "noisy" interpretation. 7 Since it plays an important role in generating the results, I give some intuition on why the noise that enters into the interpretation of the announcements decreases the candidates'expected utility from announcing policy. Consider the following example. Suppose that: (i) the policy space is [0; 1]; 7 The fact that we model non-salience (and not electoral ambiguity) implies that, if the candidates decide not to announce, they are assigned a position (or, more precisely, a lottery) by default. Moreover, the candidates have no say over this lottery. Hence, there is no simple way to extend the model in order to obtain that, in equilibrium, candidates prefer not to announce positions for extreme values of but not for central values of . This may be a nice feature of the model, since it o¤ers a testable implication robust to small perturbations of the model.
(ii) the voters distribute uniformly over the policy space; (iii) the noise term that enters additively in the voters'interpretation of the announcement made by candidate 2 is 0:1; (iv) there is no noise entering in the voter's interpretation of the announcement made by candidate 1; and (v) the two possible states of the world occur with probability 1 2 each. Also, …x candidate 1's announcement: d 1 = 0:2. In the standard Downsian model (where interpretations and announcements are identical), assuming that the candidates' payo¤s are given by their expected vote share, candidate 2's best response is to announce d 2 = 0:2 + ; 8 which gives candidate 2 a payo¤ of 0:8. However, in the model in which candidate 2's interpretation is noisy, d 2 = 0:2 + , gives candidate 2 a payo¤ of This example illustrates that, conditional on playing his best response, a candidate whose interpretation is subject to some noise pays a (utility) premium of 1 2 times the magnitude of the noise entering into the voters'interpretation of the announcement -namely: 1 2 (0:1) = 0:05. The greater the magnitude of this noise, the higher is the premium the candidate pays in expectation. Now, assume that, instead of announcing d 1 = 0:2; candidate 1 declares ;, which stands for no-announcement. Also, assume that the mean of the voters' beliefs regarding the policy that a winner who did not announce policy will implement is = 0:2. If, for expositional clarity, I assume that the voters are risk-neutral, this example and the previous one, in which d 1 = 0:2, are obviously equivalent. Note that, if candidate 2 wants to avoid paying the expected utility premium associated with announcing a position, which sums up to 1 2 (0:1), there is only one strategy he can play. In this model (unlike in the standard Downsian setting), announcing the same strategy as the opponents'does not guarantee an expected vote share of 1 2 since the interpretation of the announcements may be di¤erent even when the strategies are identical. However, if both candidates declare ;, there is no announcement and no noise and, henceforth, the candidates have identical appeal to each and every voter, implying that the expected vote share is 1 2 for each of them. To sum up, candidate 2 may avoid paying the utility premium generated by the noise in the interpretation of his announcement only if he declares ;: From candidate 2's perspective, this choice has the drawback that it deprives him of the opportunity of taking advantage of the fact that his opponent, candidate 1, has adopted an implicit position that is extreme (namely: 0:2) and, therefore, unappealing to the bulk of the voters. 9 Because this second example is equivalent to the …rst one, it follows that the best candidate 2 can do announcing policy is to announce d 2 = 0:2 + 0:1 + , which gives him an expected utility of 0:75; which is higher than the expected utility of responding with a no-announcement, namely 1 2 : If, instead, the mean of the voters'beliefs were, say, 0:47, instead of 0:2, then the best candidate 2 can do conditional on announcing policy is to announce 8 As I already remarked, strictly speaking, in the standard Downsian model there is no best response to any position other than the median. However, this is not really a problem, since I can always use the concept of "-equilibrium. The latter only requires that no player can gain more than " in expected utility by deviating from his strategy, given the strategy of his opponent.
9 To see this, note that because candidate 1 declared ;; by risk neutrality the voters associated him with the mean of their beliefs, namely 0:2, which is far away from the median, namely 0:5: This discussion makes evident that, in order to obtain non-salience, I can either …x the mean of the voters'beliefs and increase the noise that enters in the voters'interpretation of the announcements or …x the magnitude of this noise and make the mean of the voters'beliefs closer and closer to the electoral center. In the main body of the paper, I show that there is a certain threshold for the mean of the voters'beliefs for which candidate 2's incentive to deviate from ; in order to capture the votes of the electoral center is high enough to overcome the cost generated by announcing a position.
The example above gives some intuition as to why candidates that behave like simple expected utility maximizers may …nd it optimal not to announce a position in a model that slightly deviates from the standard Downsian setting. The key to my results is that this modi…cation induces a cost of announcing a position (in expected utility terms) that is proportional to the magnitude of the noise entering into the interpretation of the announcements.
When I introduce ambiguity aversion on the part of the candidates, the results are stronger, in the sense that the conditions under which candidates prefer not to announce policy are less stringent. To see why, note that within the ambiguity-aversion framework, the candidates are endowed with multiple beliefs, which in this case translates into multiple beliefs regarding the probability distributions of the states of the world. For example, consider the extreme case in which the candidates believe that any conceivable probability distribution of the states of the world is possible. Since this includes the degenerate probabilities (in which one state occurs with probability 1 and the other with probability 0), it follows readily that an ambiguity-averse candidate will act as if, with probability 1, Nature will pick the most unfavorable scenario for him. 10 Hence, in terms of the second example above, candidate 2's (maximin) expected payo¤ becomes 0 (0:53) + 1 (0:43) = 0:43 instead of 0:48. Then, not announcing a position becomes candidate 2's best response for a larger set of values of the mean of the voters'beliefs. I wish to make clear that this example is simply to anticipate some intuition, and that the actual ambiguity aversion framework adopted in this paper, variational preferences , is much richer and more realistic, and better accommodates the interpretation of the model. Finally, to the best of my knowledge, there is no paper in the literature that o¤ers an empirical study of the phenomenon of electoral ambiguity or salience. A nice feature of my model is that it generates a distinguishing testable implication. I carry out an empirical analysis of this testable implication, centered on U.S. Senate elections. First, I suggest that, under reasonable premises (discussed in Section VII), a sensible measure of the cost of reducing the noise in voters'interpretation of candidates'announcements is given by the cost of airing political TV advertising in the state in which the candidate is running for Senator. Second, I suggest that the passed/failed result of the National Political Awareness Test, conducted on each U.S. Senate candidate by Project Vote Smart, is a good proxy for whether or not the candidates announced positions. Then, I estimate a probit model to test the relationship between the cost of reducing the noise in voters' interpretation of the announcements and the probability of announcing positions. My empirical analysis shows that, ceteris paribus, the higher the cost of TV advertising in a political district, the lower the probability that the candidate will announce position. This relationship is found to be statistically signi…cant at the 5% level and robust to several minor modi…cations of the empirical model.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II, outlines the model (within the expected utility framework). Section III discusses the problem of the voters. Section IV discusses the problem of the candidates and states the main results. Section V discusses two extensions of the model within expected utility: two-candidate competition assuming maximization of expected probability of winning (instead of maximization of expected vote share) and multi-candidate competition. Section VI extends the model, by introducing ambiguity aversion, so that the candidates are concerned about an ongoing negative campaign against them. Section VII tests an empirical implication of my model. Section VIII concludes.
The Model
Consider a one-issue, simultaneous-move political contest with two candidates who have the objective of maximizing expected vote share. The candidates are assumed to know the distribution of voters' most-preferred policies. The declaration of a platform by a candidate can either (i) contain the announcement of a position in the policy space, or (ii) be empty, representing no-announcement. Note that I am using the term "declare a platform" to denote either an empty announcement or a nonempty announcement, and keeping the term "announcement" to refer to a non-empty announcement.
The distinguishing feature of this model is that the voters receive a noisy signal of the announcements, which I call the interpretation (of the announcement). This signal is assumed to be the same for all the voters. Di¤erent realizations of the noise represent di¤erent states of the world. (Intuitively, the magnitude of the noise entering into the interpretation depends on the communication technology available to the candidates.) Candidates are committed to executing the interpretation of their announced policy. If the platform is empty, the voters assume that the candidate will implement a policy randomly drawn from a known distribution. For simplicity, this distribution is assumed to be the same for both candidates.
To simplify the analysis, I make the following assumptions. First, the noise can take only two di¤erent values. One value represents a leftist bias, and the other a rightist bias. 11 Second, the communication technology is neutral, in the sense that the rightist and the leftist biases have equal probability. Third, the bias in the voters' interpretation of candidate 1's announcement is drawn independently from the bias in the voter's interpretation of candidate 2's announcement.
At this point, some minimal notation needs to be introduced. I let c index candidates 1 and 2: I use D [ f;g to denote the policy space of the candidates, where D is a compact interval and ; denotes a no-announcement. There is a set of states of the world, S S 1 S 2 , with elements denoted by s (s 1 ; s 2 ). For c 2 f1; 2g, s c , represents the bias in the interpretation of candidate c's announcement. There are two possible biases: l(ef tist) and r(ightist). Then, s 2 S represents any possible combination of biases for the candidates. 12 I let the scalar c (s) denote the noise that enters in the voters'interpretation of candidate c's announcement conditional on the state of the world s:
For the sake of exposition, I proceed to de…ne four models that will be used throughout.
The strategy space is D [ f;g; candidates 1 and 2 face noises 1 (s) and 2 (s), respectively, conditional to the state of the world s:
) is the general model under consideration. By restricting the policy space to D (instead of D [ f;g) and setting 1 (s) = 2 (s) = 0 for all s, I obtain the standard Downsian setting. The de…nitions below follow from specializing M (D [ f;g; 1 (s); 2 (s)) in other ways.
This model corresponds to the case in which the strategy space of the candidates is restricted to D, so that ; is not feasible. Hence, I also refer to it as the restricted model in which both candidates face noise in the interpretation of their announcements.
Although the strategy space of the model M (D; 1 (s); 2 (s)) is identical to the strategy space of the standard Downsian model, the two models di¤er in that, while in M (D; 1 (s); 2 (s)) the candidates face noise in the interpretation of their announcements, in the standard Downsian model they do not.
). In this model, there is no noise entering into the voters' interpretation of candidate 1's announcement.
in which 1 (s) = 0 for every state of the world s: In other words, M (D [ f;g; 0; 2 (s)) assumes that, while candidate 2 faces an imperfect technology (so that announcement and interpretation may di¤er), candidate 1 has access to a perfect communication technology (so that announcement and interpretation are identical). It is important to note that, even if the interpretation of candidate 2's announcement is identical to the announcement itself, it is still the case that the vote shares of both candidates are non-deterministic. This is because the vote share of each candidate depends on both his announcement and his opponent's announcement. Hence, as long as at least one candidate faces noise in the interpretation of his announcement, there will be a random component in the expected vote shares of both candidates.
This model corresponds to the case in which the strategy space of the candidates is restricted to D (so that ; is not feasible) and there is no noise entering into the voters' interpretation of candidate 1's announcement. Hence, I also refer to it as the restricted model in which only candidate 2 faces noise in the interpretation of his announcements.
In other words, the model M (D; 0; 2 (s)) not only restricts the candidates' space of strategies, but also assumes that only candidate 2 faces noise in the interpretation of his announcement.
For any of these models, the timing of the game is as follows. First, both candidates declare a platform. Second, Nature draws a state of the world, which the voters use to form their interpretation of the announcements. Third, the voters use this interpretation of the announcements to cast their votes.
The Voters
I index candidates by c = 1; 2 and assume a continuum of voters, indexed by i, whose most-preferred policies ("ideal points") are distributed over the unit interval according to . I use d c 2 D [ f;g to denote the declaration of platform made by candidate c in a one-dimensional polity. Here, d c 2 D, where D is a compact interval, denotes an announcement and d c = ; denotes a no-announcement. In case d c = ; for some c, in any state of the world, the voters believe that, if c wins the election, the policy to be implemented will be drawn from a known distribution common to both candidates, which I leave unspeci…ed. In the case of announcement, all voters receive the same noisy signal of d c .
I let c : S c ! f l ; r g, c 2 f1; 2g, represent the noise in the signal of candidate c's announcement; I write c (s c ). The simplest case is l = r = , where is a positive (and small) scalar. However, other cases will also be considered.
r ] for a reason that will be evident soon.
(1)
1 r ], I prevent the candidates from announcing positions whose interpretations may fall outside the support of . 13 Conditional on state s 2 S, the utility that voter i derives from the declaration of platform d c by candidate c, c 2 f1; 2g; is given by u i :
are assumed. Here, j j denotes absolute value, x i is voter i's ideal point and F (n) represents the voters'beliefs regarding the policy n 2 D f;g to be implemented if the winner does not announce policy. I assume that n is the realization of a random variable, N , from which the policy implemented by a candidate that wins without announcing is drawn. 14 Therefore, the distribution F (n) gives the probability that the realized policy for a winner with no-announcement is less than or equal to n. I assume that F is common knowledge and represents the voters'beliefs for both candidates; I use to denote its mean.
Then, the probability that voter i votes for candidate 2 conditional on state s 2 S is given by
Note that i;2 (d 2 ; d 1 js) only takes the values 0, 1 and 1 2 , representing support for candidate 1, support for candidate 2 and a tie, respectively. Note that, for d 2 = ; there is no noise in the utility 1 3 Alternatively, I could assume that both the support of and D are equal to the real line. The reason I do not take this approach is that I would lose some closed-form results.
1 4 The symbols n and N stand for no-announcement.
u of the voters -if there is no signal, there is no noise-but there is uncertainty, represented by F . Finally, within expected utility, it must be that i;1 (d 1 ; d 2 js) = 1 i;2 (d 2 ; d 1 js): Analogous procedures can be applied to derive i;c (d 1 ; d 2 js) for the other models. I omit this step to save space.
The Problem of the Candidates
The vote share of candidate c conditional to state s 2 S is
Given that the voters preferences are perfectly spatial, when both candidates announce policy, the vote share of candidate c conditional on state s is the area below the density function of in between one of the extremes of the distribution and the mean of the interpretations of the candidates' announcements.
Consider M (D [ f;g; 0; 2 (s)): (This model will be also useful to study
, the set of states of the world has only two elements. Let us use V c (d c ; d c ) to denote the expected vote share of candidate c 2 f1; 2g, with c 2 f1; 2g and c 6 = c, at the pro…le of strategies (d c ; d c ). Within the expected utility framework it must be that
where v c;l and v c;r are shortcuts for v c (d c ; d c jl) and v c (d c ; d c jr), respectively, and q l and q r denote the probability of a leftist and rightist interpretation, respectively. Whenever the context avoids confusion, I drop the subindex c in v c;l and v c;r : Throughout, I make the neutral assumption that q l = q r = 1 2 ; which implies that the leftist and the rightist interpretations of candidate 2's announcement are equally likely. The problem of candidate c 2 f1; 2g is to maximize V c ( ; d c ).
Note that, to check whether a pro…le of strategies 
Equilibria within Expected Utility
In this subsection, I investigate under which conditions non-salience occurs in equilibrium. Proposition 5, below, deals with M (D [ f;g; 0; 2 (s)). Proposition 7 and Proposition 8, below, deal instead with M (D [ f;g; 1 (s); 2 (s)). The reason that Proposition 5 deals with the case in which there is no noise in the interpretation of one candidate is that the analysis of equilibrium is greatly simpli…ed under this assumption. Notice that Proposition 8 proves that there is a robust non-salient equilibrium under the assumption that both candidates face identical structures. This makes clear that my main result is not driven by any asymmetry in the candidates'problem. The proofs are contained in Appendix D and rely heavily on the best response correspondences for M (D [ f;g; 0; 2 (s)) derived in Appendix A.
Throughout, represents the distribution of ideal points of the voters (which is left unspeci…ed); m represents the ideal point of the median voter; and represents the mean of the voters' beliefs regarding the policy that will be implemented by a winner who did not announce a position. Finally, I
remark that an alternative, more rigorous statement of Proposition 5 can be obtained by introducing the concept of "-equilibrium. The latter would circumvent the fact that, strictly speaking, in the standard Downsian setting the best response of the candidates is empty for any position adopted by the opponent other than m. However, more notation would need to be introduced without gaining further insight.
Proposition 5 Consider M (D [ f;g; 0; 2 (s)) and set 2 (l) = 2 (r) = , with 0: Assume m (the case > m is analogous). A necessary condition for an equilibrium in which candidate 1 annouces position and candidate 2 strictly prefers not to announce position is
A direct corollary of Proposition 5 is that, in M (D [ f;g; 0; 2 (s)), if 2 (s) = 0 for all s, so that there is no noise in the interpretation of any candidate, then, in equilibrium, the candidates must announce position. (To see this, note that, if 2 (s) = 0 for all s, the condition in Proposition 5 reduces ( ) > 1 2 , which can never be satis…ed under the premise that m.) This corollary shows that the noise in the interpretation of candidates'announcements is necessary to obtain non-salience. Otherwise, I go back to previous impossibility results found by Berliant and Konishi (2005) . Also, Proposition 5 anticipates some intuition for my main result, since it makes evident that a necessary condition for non-salience is that and m be close enough. The following case illustrates this point (its proof is also contained in Appendix D).
Case 6
If is the uniform distribution over the unit interval, then, for < m; a necessary and su¢ cient condition for an equilibrium in which one candidate announces and the other not is > m Because the optimal strategy of the candidate who faces no noise is to make an epsilon deviation from the mean of the voters' beliefs about his opponent, it follows that, in equilibrium, there is "convergence" in the sense that the implicit and explicit positions of the candidates di¤er only by an epsilon.
Proposition 7 below shows that, in the model in which both candidates face noise in the interpretation of their announcements, convergence to the ideal point of the median voter can be equilibrium. The theorem presents su¢ cient conditions. Of course, the necessary conditions may be less stringent. 15 Proposition 7 Consider M (D [ f;g; 1 (s); 2 (s)) and set 1 (l) = 2 (l) = 1 (r) = 2 (r) = ; with 0. A su¢ cient condition for the pro…le (m; m) to be a Nash equilibrium is that be symmetric and that < m or > m + :
(Same results to those stated in Proposition 7 hold when 1 (l) = 2 (r) and 1 (r) = 2 (l), with c (s) 6 = 0 for all c; s, as long as j 1 (l) 2 (l)j and j 1 (r) 2 (r)j are su¢ ciently small. The latter conditions are more inclusive than the conditions in Proposition 7 ). Now that I have (i) given some intuition on how the model works, and (ii) showed that the model does not rule other desirable equilibria (such as both candidates converging to the electoral center), I can introduce my main result. Consider M (D [ f;g; 1 (s); 2 (s)) and assume that the magnitude of the noise terms is identical across candidates and states of the world. Can it be that in equilibrium both candidates prefer not to announce a policy position?
Proposition 8 Consider M (D [ f;g; 1 (s); 2 (s)) and assume that: 1 (l) = 2 (l) = 1 (r) = 2 (r) = , with 0. The pro…le (;; ;) is a (strict) Nash equilibrium if and only if
Proposition 8 says that there is an open set of values of the parameters in which both candidates not annnouncing position is a strict equilibrium. The condition ( + ) > 1 ( ) > ( ) has two possible readings. First, it may read that, for a …xed 0, the parameters and m have to be close enough. Second, it may read that, for …xed and m; has to be large enough. The following case illustrates these two points specializing to the uniform distribution.
Case 9 Assume is the uniform distribution over the unit interval. It follows readily from Proposition 5 that the pro…le (;; ;) is a (strict) Nash equilibrium if and only if m + Berliant and Konishi (2005) have proved that, within expected utility, in a robust equilibrium both candidates must announce positions. Using a minimal set of assumptions, Propositions 5 and 8 overcome this impossibility result. Of course, the di¤erence relies on the fact that our models are formally di¤erent. In their setting, there is no noise in the voters'interpretation of the candidates' announcement. Hence, the utility that candidate c gets from not announcing policy, assuming riskneutral voters, is identical to the utility he gets from announcing the mean of the voters' beliefs. In my model, the utility that candidate c gets from not announcing policy, assuming risk neutral voters, is identical to the utility he gets when the voters' interpretation coincides with the mean of their beliefs. The fact that there is a degree of imprecision in his announcement precludes the candidate from having a perfect control over how the voters will interpret his announcement. This degree of imprecision in candidate c's communication technology increases the payo¤ from not announcing relative to the payo¤ of announcing the best response in the restricted game, which leads the candidate to prefer not to announce under certain con…gurations of the parameters. Finally, the fact that there is no noise in the absence of announcement breaks down the translation invariance property of the voters'preferences, key to the three proofs of the theorems in Berliant and Konishi (2005) . A graphical illustration of the intuition behind Proposition 8 is available in the next section, although there I assume that the candidates maximize probability of winning (instead of vote share) and that there are three possible interpretations of each announcement.
5 Extensions Within Expected Utility 5.1 Two-candidate competition with maximization of expected probability of winning
The insight behind Proposition 8 also applies when candidates are assumed to maximize expected probability of winning (instead of expected vote share). To see this, let us now assume that there are three (instead of two) possible interpretations of an announcement, and each of them occurs with probability 1 3 . I refer to these interpretations as the leftist, the rightist and the correct interpretation, and denote them by and i L , i R and i C ; respectively. Let i L and i R be as before, and i C be the interpretation that coincides with the announcement of the candidate itself -in this sense, i C is the "correct" interpretation. I refer the reader to Figure 1.
Figure 1: Any unilateral deviation from (;; ;) leaves the candidate worse o¤. Here, candidate 2 deviates to announce d 2 = i C . The voters may interpret i L ; i C or i R , which bring about cut points A, B and C, respectively. While cut points A and B give the victory to candidate 1; cut point C gives the victory to candidate 2: Since each interpretation has probability 1 3 ; candidate 2's expected probability of victory, 1 3 ; is lower than the probability of victory when no deviation occurs, The …gure makes evident that the pro…le (;; ;) is a Nash equilibrium. As Proposition 8 suggests, the key to obtaining non-salience is that be close enough to m: When the latter condition is satis…ed, candidate 2 has basically two options. On the one hand, he may announce the same implicit position than candidate 1 -that is, . In this case, if (i) i 2 = i C ; candidate 2 wins with probability 1 2 , (ii) i 2 = i L , candidate 2 loses with certainty, and (iii) i 2 = i R , candidate 2 loses with certainty (note that this presumes that and m are close enough or, alternatively, that is large enough). Since each interpretation has probability 1 3 , this implies that candidate 2's probability of victory is 1 6 . On the other hand, candidate 2 may announce a position to the left of candidate 1's implicit position, such that the rightist interpretation of this announcement is associated to a cut point like point C in the …gure, which gives him the victory. In this case, if (i) i 2 = i C ; candidate 2 loses with certainty, (ii) i 2 = i L , candidate 2 loses with certainty, (iii) i 2 = i R , candidate 2 wins with certainty. Since each interpretation has probability 1 3 ; this implies that candidate 2's probability of victory is 1 3 : This strategy dominates the previous one, but is still strictly lower than the expected probability of winning at the pro…le (;; ;). Finally, note that, to obtain non-salience, it is required that, in addition to the leftist and rightist interpretation, there be also a third possible interpretation of the announcements, i C . Otherwise, candidate 2 can generically obtain a vote share of 1 2 using a strategy similar to the second one described in this paragraph.
Multi-candidate competition
The rationale behind Proposition 8 also applies in electoral competitions with more than two candidates. However, the more candidates participating in the competition, the more stringent are the conditions under which all candidates will prefer not to announce position. In fact, under conditions The reason that, as N increases, the conditions under which non-salience occurs in equilibrium are more and more stringent is as follows. Since the voters'beliefs are assumed to be identical across candidates, the expected vote share for a candidate at the pro…le in which all candidates do not announce is 1 N . If a candidate deviates from the latter pro…le, the votes split as follows. A share 0 1 of the vote goes to the candidate that deviates, and the rest, 1 , is divided in identical shares among the remaining N 1 candidates, so that each receives, in expectation, N 1 . When a new candidate enters the competition, the vote share that goes to the unique candidate that deviates from ; remains intact (namely, is equal to ), and the remaining (N + 1) 1 candidates now get a smaller share, N . Therefore, the payo¤ of deviating relative to declaring ; decreases monotonically as N increases.
The fact that the conditions for non-salience become more stringent as N increases is an empirical implication of my model. Furthermore, assume that Duverger's law, which asserts that the plurality rule tends to generate to two-party systems, e¤ectively holds. Then, my model predicts that plurality-rule systems should be more prone to generating non-salience than proportional representation systems. I leave the test of this empirical implication for future research.
Democrats versus Republicans
A natural concern is what happens if the beliefs about the policy that candidate 1 will implement if he wins o¢ ce and did not announce policy are di¤erent to the beliefs for candidate 2. For example, imagine that candidate 1 is a Democrat and candidate 2 is a Republican. Given their party backgrounds, the voters may have in mind a distribution of policies (in absence of announcement) for candidate 1 (2) whose mean is to the left (right) of the median. For expositional ease, we mantain the assumption that voters are risk neutral, so that all that matters is the mean of the voters'beliefs. Do similar qualitative results hold? Next we show that the answer is yes. Throughout, we use c , c 2 f1; 2g, to denote the mean of the voters' beliefs regarding the policy that candidate c will implement if he wins the election without announcing policy.
2 , with 1 ; 2 0. For any 1 < m; 2 > m, the pro…le (;; ;) is a (strict) Nash equilibrium if and only if
For ease of interpretation, consider 1 and 2 equidistant from the median m. Then, 2 1 + 2 2 reduces to 1, and both conditions in Proposition 11 can be summarized as
It is immediate to see the analogy between the latter condition and the condition in Proposition 8. Again, the intuition is that in order to obtain non-salience, it is required that either 1 and 2 be close enough to the median of or that the magnitude of noise entering in the interpretation of the voters be large enough. Proposition 11 o¤ers three additional insights. First, not announcing policy is candidate c's best strategy provided the mean of the beliefs for candidate c -not for candidate c-, is centrally located. Otherwise, candidate c prefers to announce position. Second, not announcing policy is candidate c's best strategy provided the magnitude of the noise entering in the interpretation of his own announcement -not his rival's announcement-is large enough. Third, if 1 and 2 are not symmetrically located around the median, the candidates's incentives change in the following manner. Start from a situation in which 1 and 2 are symmetrically located around the median, and consider a shift of 1 further away from the median. Then, candidate 1 will be less likely to be silent than before (since the second condition in Proposition 11 becomes more stringent). However, the e¤ect that such a shift of 1 exerts on candidate 2's incentives to announce a policy is undetermined, as it induces opposite forces in the …rst condition of Proposition 11.
The fact that, ceteris paribus, a shift of c further away from the median creates contradictory incentives for candidate c's decision problem implies that one of the monotone comparative statics of the model is lost. In other words, we can no longer say that if both candidates being silent is an equilibrium, a shift of c towards the median ideal point guarantees that the same pro…le will still be an equilibrium. However, it is immediate to check that, according to Proposition 11, the other monotone comparative statics of the model is not lost. Namely, in this generalization of the model in which both the mean of the voters beliefs and the magnitude of the noise entering in their interpretations are candidate-dependent, an increase in the magnitude of the noise entering in candidate c's interpretation can never anhilate a non-salient equilibrium. And, conversely, if both candidates being silent is not an equilibrium, a decrease in c can never lead, ceteris paribus, to that equilibrium. This consideration will be of utmost importance for our empirical analysis.
6 Ambiguity Aversion
Candidates'Problem
The candidates, indexed by c = 1; 2; seek to maximize expected vote share in a one-dimensional political contest with simultaneous moves. Letting represent the distribution of voters' ideal points, the vote share of candidate c conditional on state s 2 S is
where the function i;c is as de…ned in Equation (3). Note that, because it is conditioned on a particular state of the world, there is no stochastic element entering in Equation (4) For simplicity, throughout this section I assume that is the uniform distribution over the unit interval. It is straightforward to obtain the same qualitative results with any other symmetric and unimodal distribution. Moreover, I conjecture that unimodality alone may su¢ ce to obtain similar qualitative results. d c ; d c ) from which the electoral result will be drawn, after Nature draws the state of the world. The next step consists of endowing the candidates with preferences that allow them to rank conditional acts.
In the standard expected utility framework discussed in the previous section, it was implicitly assumed that the candidates choose among acts by computing the expected value, E s2S [v c (d 1 ; d 2 )]; using a unique and common prior belief. Now, I depart from this framework by assuming that the candidates have multiple ("ambiguous") beliefs; I use ( ) to denote this set of beliefs. The candidates do not know which, among the many beliefs ( ), is the actual probability distribution of states of the world.
In order to deal with the many beliefs, the candidates need to be endowed with a certain rule. Since, in this extension of the model, I aim to account for candidates'fear that either their opponents or, in general, the mass media, may engage in "negative campaigning" against them, maximin expected utility with multiple priors appears to be an appropriate rule. Namely, in a context in which interpretations and announcements may di¤er -this is the distinguishing premise of my baseline model-it seems sensible to assume that each candidate c 2 f1; 2g is concerned with the possibility that his opponent, c, will attempt to convince the voters that the "correct" interpretation of c's announcement is whichever is most convenient for c; and, therefore, less convenient for c. The quotation in which Michael Dukakis explains the role played by "phraseology" and negative campaigning in the 1988 election (above in the Introduction) provides anecdotal evidence that this behavior may be present among political candidates.
To model this behavior on the part of candidates, I use the variational representation of preferences , which generalizes maximin expected utility with multiple priors (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989) . It has been proved that the behavioral assumptions made by these two approaches are almost identical since the axioms on which they rely are . Aside from their high degree of generality, some specializations of variational preferences are very tractable and, in particular, di¤erentiable. The main advantage over maximin preferences is that calculus can be used.
A preference is called variational if it satis…es the following axioms: weak order, weak certainty independence, continuity, monotonicity, uncertainty aversion and nondegeneracy (see . The axiom of uncertainty aversion is usually interpreted as an ambiguity aversion axiom (among others, see Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989, and Epstein 1999) . For an extended discussion of ambiguity aversion, I refer the reader to Ellsberg (1961) .
Individuals endowed with ambiguity-averse preferences in general (and variational preferences in particular) are customarily interpreted as believing that they are playing a zero-sum game against a malevolent agent. Such "paranoid" behavior has been encountered in experiments where the individ-uals have limited information (see, for example, Keren and Gerritsen, 1999) . Variational preferences allow for di¤erent degrees of "paranoia." If extreme paranoia is assumed, then the individuals behave as a maximinimizers of expected utility with multiple priors. In such a case, the interpretation is straightforward: the individuals believe that they will confront the worst possible scenario. However, variational preferences also allow for moderate degrees of paranoia. Finally, among variational preferences, I choose Gini preferences to represent the candidates'preferences because they are very tractable and di¤erentiable. The utility functional is introduced below, as Functional (5).
The Game
Consider model M (D [ f;g; 1 (s); 2 (s)): The timing of the game is as follows. In period t = 0, the candidates declare platforms simultaneously. A declaration of a platform by candidate c 2 f1; 2g is either (i) an announcement of policy d c 2 D; or (ii) a no-announcement, namely d c = ;: Gini preferences imply that candidate c ranks act v c (d 1 ; d 2 ) according to the following utility functional,
where > 0 is the ambiguity coe¢ cient, which I assume to be the same for both candidates. The closer comes to zero, the more ambiguity-averse the candidate is.
(pjjq) is the relative Gini index between distributions p and q: 17 An individual endowed with ambiguity-averse preferences has multiple beliefs, (q), and acts as if there were a malevolent in ‡uence playing a zero-sum game against him. Functional (5) makes evident that the hostile in ‡uence is allegedly exerted through the choice of a prior adverse to candidate c, denoted p c 2 (q):
At the beginning of period t = 1, Nature draws the noise in the interpretation of candidate 1's announcement (if there was an announcement), and also the noise in the interpretation of candidate 2's announcement (if there was an announcement). Some of the propositions below consider M (D [ f;g; 0; 2 (s)), in which candidate 1 faces no noise in the interpretation of his announcement (instead of M (D[f;g; 1 (s); 2 (s))). This reduces the space of states of the world entering into both V (v 1 (d 1 ; d 2 )) and V (v 2 (d 2 ; d 1 )) to S = S 2 = fl(ef t); r(ight)g, simplifying the analysis.
Because the candidates have multiple priors, they do not expect Nature to draw the noise terms from the reference distribution q; each of them expects Nature to use a distribution from (q) that gives him a lower expected utility than q. Strictly speaking, each candidate expects Nature to draw from arg min
It is important to note that, because each candidate believes that there is a malevolent in ‡uence acting against him, two prior beliefs regarding the state of world are relevant: (i) the prior that candidate 1 thinks the hostile in ‡uence chooses to weaken him; (ii) the prior that candidate 2 thinks the hostile in ‡uence chooses to weaken him. This is irrespective of whether both candidates or only one candidate face(s) noise in his interpretation. (In other words, it is true for both M (D [ f;g; 0; 2 (s)) and M (D [ f;g; 1 (s); 2 (s)) ) The only di¤erence that assuming noise in one or both interpretations makes is how many elements are in the set of states of the world, S.
At the end of period t = 1, the voters use the noises drawn by Nature, s 2 S, to form their interpretation of the announcements of each candidate, i c . For simplicity, I assume that the interpretation of announcements is identical across voters. If a candidate did not announce, then the voters assume that if he wins, a policy drawn from the distribution F (n) will be implemented. I call F (n) the beliefs of the voters. I simplify by assuming that these beliefs are identical across voters and are the same for both candidates. Finally, voters use these interpretations to cast their votes. Voters are assumed to have standard spatial preferences exhibiting risk-neutrality.
Gini Preferences
The problem of the candidates is to maximize Functional (5). Hence, from a formal point of view, the model can be closed by establishing (i) a functional form for (p c jjq) and, (ii) an equilibrium concept. However, it may be useful to …rst discuss the interpretation of Functional (5).
Let us focus on a particular aspect of Functional (5), namely the problem given by expression (6). In my interpretation of the model, this problem can be stated as: What distribution of noise does candidate c believe Nature will draw the noises from? I refer to this as the hostile in ‡uence's problem. 18 Under the Gini preferences assumption, each candidate believes that the hostile in ‡uence will choose a prior, p c , from the set (q); that weakens his expected vote share. However, this paranoia need not be absolute. Indeed, unlike the maximin multiple priors framework, variational preferences do not imply that the candidates expect the malevolent agent to choose the prior that minimizes their expected utility. This is because the choice of distribution is constrained by a structure, as I explain next.
On the one hand, the hostile in ‡uence bears a certain cost of implementing her choice of a prior distribution. This cost is given by the term (p c jjq) in expression (6) above. The larger the "distance" between the choice of distribution and an (exogenously given) reference distribution, the costlier it becomes for the hostile in ‡uence to implement that choice. 19 Hence, the hostile in ‡uence must pay a cost to force Nature to sample from an alternative distribution. (And the candidates understand that the larger the deviation is, the costlier its implementation becomes.) On the other hand, the hostile in ‡uence gets utility from weakening the candidate's position; or, equivalently put, it gets disutility from every unitary increase in the candidate's expected vote share. This disutility is given by the term R v c (d c ; d c )dp c in expression (6) above. Note that each candidate thinks of the media as a rational actor in the sense that, given the cost of implementing a choice of prior and the disutility of the candidate's expected vote share, it implements the optimal prior distribution. Namely, each candidate acts as if the hostile in ‡uence were endowed with a utility function and seeks to maximize it. This utility function would be equal to the opposite of the sum of the candidate's expected utility and the cost of inducing such expected utility conditional on the chosen pro…le of strategies (by implementing a particular distribution of noise). In order to aggregate these two heterogenous bads, a ratio that represents the marginal rate of substitution between them (for the hostile in ‡uence) is required. I refer to this ratio as the coe¢ cient of ambiguity aversion. For simplicity, I assume that both candidates believe that the hostile in ‡uence 1 8 It should be clear by now that because the hostile in ‡uence is only a mental construction of the players, the hostile in ‡uence's problem is, more precisely, the problem that each candidate believes the alleged hostile in ‡uence faces.
1 9 To measure the distance between distributions, we use relative entropy.
has the same coe¢ cient of ambiguity aversion. The coe¢ cient of ambiguity aversion is given by the constant in expression (6). Finally, notice that the reference distribution is (from our perspective) the actual distribution of noise. It may be helpful to discuss how Functional (5) works when the coe¢ cient of ambiguity aversion, , tends to its extreme values: 0 and 1. Consider, …rst, a coe¢ cient close to 0. This means that the hostile in ‡uence is willing to provide any amount of e¤ort in exchange for the reduction of one vote in the candidate's expected vote share. (Equivalently, the disutility of spending an extra unit of e¤ort in reducing the candidates'expected vote share is zero). Not surprisingly, a coe¢ cient close to 0 is equivalent to assuming that the candidates behave as maximinimizers of expected utility with multiple priors (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989) . Consider, now, a coe¢ cient approaching to 1: This means that the hostile in ‡uence is willing to give up any amount of candidates'vote share in exchange for a reduction of its e¤ort in one unit. (Equivalently, the marginal utility of a malevolent act is zero). Not surprisingly, a coe¢ cient approaching 1 is equivalent to assuming that the candidates behave as standard maximizers of expected utility. For further details on variational preferences, and for the proof of the insights o¤ered in this paragraph, I refer the reader to Maccheroni et al. (2006) .
I use p c = (p c;l ; p c;r ) to denote any distribution that candidate c 2 f1; 2g may expect to be implemented against him. And I use p c = p c;l ; p c;r to denote the distribution that maximizes the hostile in ‡uence's utility function. The cost to induce p c = (p c;l ; p c;r ) is given by the Gini relative index 20 between p c and the reference distribution q. The Gini relative index between p c and q is given by
The reference distribution q gives the distribution of noise in the absence of any malevolent in ‡uence for any ordered pair of announcements by candidates 1 and 2, namely (d 1 ; d 2 ). I assume
where q l represents the probability of event s l , and q r the probability of event s r . To rule out any asymmetry, the reference distribution is the same for both candidates.
Equilibrium Concept
A strategy for candidate c is a choice of action d c 2 D [ f;g: An equilibrium for this game is a strategy pro…le
g satisfying certain conditions. Note that for any given strategy pro…le, candidate 1's and candidate 2's beliefs about the "optimal" choice of distribution by the media, p 1 and p 2 ; respectively, are endogenously given by Functional (5).
De…nition 12 A Nash equilibrium for this game is a pro…le of strategies
as candidate c's belief, for c 2 f1; 2g.
The equilibria with Variational Preferences
The best response correspondences in Appendix B allows us to obtain the equilibria in the restricted game M (D; 0; 2 (s) It follows readily from Propositions 13 and Case 9 that ambiguity aversion ampli…es the likelihood of candidates opting for no-announcement. That is, as the candidates become more and more ambiguity-averse, the values of the parameters for which non-salience occurs in equilibrium is larger and larger. It also follows that non-salience is possible only for non-zero values of : Otherwise, I go back to the standard Downsian problem, and the impossibility results of Berliant and Konishi (2005) obtain. The larger , the more likely the candidates will opt for no-announcement in equilibrium. Also, if = m; it is always the case that the candidates prefer not to announce.
The need for the threshold 1 4 stems from the fact that the probabilities p depend on (see Appendix C). This threshold is a su¢ cient condition for an interior solution for p . For lower levels of ; the probabilities may become degenerate, implying that the decrease in V (d c ; d c ) with has an end. This implies that the values of for which there is non-salience can only be enlarged, using ambiguity aversion, up to some point. 21 In order to investigate the salient equilibria, it is analytically helpful to restrict our attention to M (D [ f;g; 0; 2 (s)): Proposition 14 says that 0 jm j is a su¢ cient condition for convergence to the median to be an equilibrium of the game M (D [ f;g; 0; 2 (s)): Note that this condition is independent of . Then, even for close to zero (high levels of ambiguity aversion), it is possible to obtain robust salience, as long as is su¢ ciently distant from m: As becomes closer to m (or, alternatively, increases), convergence to the median is no longer an equilibrium.
Altogether, propositions 13 and 14 suggest that the model is able to generate both salient and non-salient equilibria within the ambiguity aversion framework. Similar considerations follow from ]; which corresponds to = 4 : the propositions in the previous section, within the expected utility framework. In this respect, the model is prima facie congruent with actual politics, where both salient and non-salient outcomes are observed. However, a nice feature of the model is that it allows a much more challenging empirical test. In the next section, I describe and pursue this empirical test using data on U.S. Senate elections.
Testable Implications
No matter whether the candidates are expected utility maximizers or ambiguity-averse, a robust implication of the theoretical model is that the larger the magnitude of noise entering into the voters' interpretation of the announcements, the more likely the candidates will prefer not to announce policy (see Propositions 5, 8 and 13 above). The aim of this section is to test this empirical implication.
In the theoretical model, the candidates have only one possible means of delivering their messages to the population. In the real world, the literature distinguishes two types (or, in our terms, "technologies") of communication within TV campaigns: paid ads (PA) and news coverage (NC). Ansolabehere et al. (1993) report that senatorial campaigns rely primarily on PA and only secondarily on NC.
Two di¤erences between NC and PA are relevant to the analysis. First, while NC can alter, bias or misrepresent the events of a campaign (and, in particular, a candidate's speech), PA circumvents any intervention by the media in the delivery of a message to the voters and, therefore, prevents any source of distortion. Moreover, since advertising is protected by the constitutional right of free speech, the candidates can deliver any message they want to the voters, no matter how untruthful it may be. 22 In brief, messages might have been censored, distorted or critiqued by journalists or anchormen in NC can be delivered straightforward to the voters using PA. In terms of the parameters of the theoretical model, it seems reasonable to say that the delivery of a message through NC is associated with a large magnitude of noise in the voters'interpretation of the candidates'announcements, and that the delivery of a message through PA is associated with a small magnitude of noise. The second di¤erence is that, while NC costs the candidates nothing, PA is a rather expensive technology for delivering messages to the voters. (This speci…c issue will be further discussed in the next subsection.)
My empirical analysis relies on the following premises: (i) when considering strategic choices, candidates are concerned about the possibility that voters may misinterpret their announcements; (ii) any eventual misinterpretation by the voters can be (at least partially) corrected by airing PA that clarify the issue; (iii) candidates may engage in costly fund-raising activity in order to collect money to buy PA, and (iv) the cost structure of fund-raising is similar across states.
Premises (i)-(iv) let us informally extend the theoretical model in the main body of this paper to a more realistic setting. In this setting, the candidates can not only announce or not announce, but also have the option of making further announcements in order to correct voters' eventual misinterpretations.
Premise (i) is the mainstay of the theoretical model in the main body of this paper. Premise (ii) suggests that PA is the technology that gives the candidates enough of a level of precision to either minimize the likelihood of misinterpretations of their announcements or emend observed misinterpretations. 23 It follows from this assumption that the price of PA represents the cost of conveying a message whose interpretation will be (at least partially) free of noise. Premise (iii) provides the candidates a means to raise the money necessary to purchase this technology. 24 Premise (iv) has been used already in the literature (see Gerber, 1998) . The two most compelling justi…cations are that Senators usually raise individual donations from out of state (Sorauf, 1992) , and a substantive share of the contributions come from Political Action Committees (PACs), which contribute in exchange for the senators'commitment to vote a certain way on particular issues.
The following simple example may illuminate the rationale behind the test of the empirical implication of the model. Consider two states, that di¤er only in their population size. State L has a large population and State S has a small population. It is important to keep in mind that I am not considering competing candidates. Instead, I am considering two candidates running di¤erent races; one of them runs for a Senate seat to represent State L, and the other runs for a Senate seat to represent State S. The candidates are compulsorily subjected to news coverage (NC), but have the option to deliver messages using paid ads (PA). NC is free, but, unlike messages delivered through PA, it may lead to the misinterpretation of the candidates' announcements. Premise (i) says that the candidates are concerned about the chance that voters may misinterpret their announcements. Therefore, in evaluating whether or not to announce positions, the candidates will consider the consequences, in term of their expected payo¤, of an eventual misinterpretation. By assumption (ii), the candidates know that, in case of misinterpretation, they will have to give away an amount of money proportional to the cost of airing PA to emend the misinterpretation. By premise (iii), this monetary cost can, in turn, be reduced to time, e¤ort and promises made in exchange for contributions (these three are the main inputs of the fund-raising campaigns). Let me point out here that a well-established fact of TV media markets is that the cost of airing a TV ad is determined mainly by the size of the TV market (this is discussed thoroughly in the next subsection). This implies that the candidate running in State L will face a larger cost of airing TV ads than the candidate running in State S. By premise (iv), the cost that the candidates running for states L and S must incur to …nance PA is similar.
In this context, the empirical implication of the theoretical model can be formulated as a simple comparative-static exercise. On the one hand, the candidate running in State L faces a higher cost of PA than the candidate running in State S. On the other hand, the candidate running in State L has the same endowment of time and political freedom than the candidate running in State S. Clearly, time and political freedom are the main inputs of any fund-raising campaign. The assumption that candidates face similar fund-raising structures implies that both candidates can transform time and political freedom into dollars at similar rates (i.e., with similar levels of e¤ectiveness). Since the cost of emending a misinterpretation by the voters (in terms of time and political freedom) is higher for the candidate running in State L than for the candidate running in State S, it readily follows that opportunity cost of announcing position is higher for the candidate running in State L than for the candidate running in State S. I can now state the empirical implication that corresponds to this version of the theoretical model as follows. Ceteris paribus, the higher the price of PA in a political district, the lower the probability that the candidate will announce positions.
The example above illustrates some important points. First, di¤erences in the population size across states su¢ ce to generate variation in the opportunity cost of announcing positions. This suggests that there are aspects of the phenomenon of non-salience deeply rooted in the fundamentals of a polity, rather than in social norms or institutions.
Second, the example shows that the money available to the candidates can be easily endogenized in the model. As a result, the amount of money available to the candidates is ultimately determined by their fund-raising e¤orts. Namely, fund-raising is costly in terms of time, money and political degrees of freedom.
Third, and most importantly, the key independent variable to test the model is the cost of PA across states, and not the number of PA aired by the candidates. Namely, what is relevant to the candidates'decision problem is the expected cost of emending the voters'beliefs, and not the ex-post cost. The theoretical model developed in the main body of this paper is static in nature, assumes that the candidates know with certainty that the voters will misinterpret their announcements (although they do not know the direction of this misinterpretation) and, above all, assumes that candidates have no means to emend possible misinterpretations by the voters. The reason these theoretical assumptions were made is that they greatly simplify the analysis. However, in a more realistic setting, when candidates make their strategic decisions on whether or not to announce positions, they take into account the fact that, if they announce, they can observe the voters'interpretations and emend any misinterpretation (at a certain cost) by airing more and more accurate messages, which will update the voters' interpretation. 25 Clearly, in this setting, the key variable in the candidates' cost-bene…t analysis that will decide their strategy is the expected cost of emending eventual misinterpretations by the voters. Unlike this latter expected cost, the actual number of PA or the money spent in PA can not be valid measures for the opportunity cost of announcing positions. This is because the analysis requires a measure of the opportunity cost of announcing position at the moment of making the strategic decision, not after this decision has been made. 26 The remainder of this section is devoted to empirically testing the mentioned theoretical implication. I carry out a cross-sectional analysis of the Senate elections in the U.S.A. As I will show, this analysis bene…ts from the fact that prices of PA vary a lot across states -much more than across time. The choice of Senate, instead of House races, is due to the fact that House campaigns do not 2 5 Although presumably complex, this richer version of the theoretical game may be technically feasible even with ambiguity averse candidates. Technical frameworks appropriate for this kind of models are Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993) and Maccheroni et al. (2006b) .
2 6 Assuming that a candidate did announce position, the actual number of PA or the money spent in PA is a measure of the ex-post cost, i.e., it is a measure of the cost of having emended the distortions in the interpretation of his announcement. However, since the idea of our analysis is to model the decision itself of announcing (i.e., the probability of announcing), we can not use a measure that is valid only if the candidates are assumed to have announced. In other words, using the actual number of PA or the money spent in PA would be a highly distorted measure of this cost, since those candidates that did announce position will have aired more PA (and have spent more money) than those candidates that did not announce position.
rely on TV ads as much as Senate races do (to the point that some House candidates do not advertise on TV at all).
Measures and Data description
I use the Passed NPAT / Failed NPAT status of the National Political Awareness Test (NPAT) as a measure of whether the candidates announced or did not announce policy. NPAT is a key component of Project Vote Smart (PVS), a well-known, serious non-pro…t organization that aims to provide citizens with abundant and accurate information about U.S.A. political candidates at any level. The aim of the NPAT, as described by Project Vote Smart, is to measure each candidate's willingness to provide citizens with their issue positions. Each election, PVS organizes an e¤ort of over 200 media organizations and political leaders who write, call, and repetitiously encourage each and every candidate to provide essential information regarding his/her position on di¤erent relevant issues. Candidates who agree to …ll out a questionnaire regarding their positions on many issues, sign it and submit, knowing that this information will be uploaded and distributed freely, are given the status "Passed NPAT." Candidates who do not accept or simply do not respond to the queries of PVS and the 200 media organizations and political leaders, are given the status "Failed NPAT. The NPAT is a dummy variable, where 0 denotes that the candidate failed the NPAT and 1 denotes that the candidate passed the NPAT. "Passed NPAT" means that the candidate …lled out, signed and submitted Project Vote Smart's form asking the candidate to report his position on several issues, and "Failed NPAT" means that the candidate failed to take this series of actions. I use cost per point of spot TV advertisement, which comes from the Media Market Guide (2004), as a basis for the construction of the measure of the cost of paid ads (PA). The cost per point (CPP) is an estimate of the dollars required to deliver one rating point (or one percent of the audience) for any designated population within a spot TV market (DMA) area. It is important to note that TV market areas, called designated market areas (DMAs), need not coincide with political districts. On the one hand, a particular DMA may extend across counties of more than one state. For example, the so-called New York DMA comprises, among many others, the counties of Fair…eld (CT), Essex (NJ), Kings (NY), and Pike (PA). On the other hand, di¤erent counties within a particular state may be spanned by di¤erent DMAs. For example, California comprises, among many others, the DMAs of Los Angeles, Sacramento-Stockton-Modesto, San Diego and San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose. As I will explain shortly, the lack of a one-to-one correspondence between political districts and DMAs has important implications that need to be accounted for in the analysis.
TV cost across DMAs varies greatly. While the CCP in 2004 reached $1,477 in the most expensive DMA, New York (NY), it was just $5 in the most inexpensive DMA, North Platte (NE); the median CPP among all markets is $ 150, which corresponds to Milwaukee (WI). 28 Being the basic unit used to construct media plans and budgeting schedules across markets, CPP is available for di¤erent demographic groups, quarterly and for di¤erent day parts. For the sake of this research, any of these variants of CPP could be used since the relative CPP across media markets remains more or less the same for any possible combination of demographic group, quarter, year and day time. In my data, the demographic group is households, the quarter is the second quarter of 2004 and the day time is late news. 29 Because CPP is the cost per one percent of the audience, the di¤erence in CPP between, say, New York (NY) and North Platte (NE) is driven primarily by the fact that one percent of New York's audience comprises a much larger number of households than one percent of North Platte's audience. I use this measure, rather than, say, cost per thousand households, because the impact of an ad seen by one thousand households in a large market like is obviously very di¤erent from the impact of an ad seen by one thousand households in a small market. The use of a measure that accounts for a given percentage, rather than a given number, of households, makes the cross-market measures comparable.
A more debatable methodological aspect of my study is the construction of the cost of political advertising. The question is: what is the cost of political advertising in each state? If there were a one-to-one correspondence between TV markets and political districts, the solution would be simple. But there is none. The …rst problem is that to advertise in, say, Newark (NJ), a political candidate is forced to pay the whole price of advertising in the New York DMA. Note that from the candidate's point of view, this is a rather ine¢ cient investment, since to deliver his message to his potential voters, the candidate is forced to also pay for the delivery of his message to, among others, all New Yorkers (who do not belong to his political district). Conversely, if a candidate in, say, Alabama, wants to deliver his message to all the potential voters in his state, he would be forced to purchase time in not one but nine DMAs, while a candidate in, say, Utah, would have to purchase time in only one DMA. These examples illustrate that the degree of fragmentation of the media markets varies enormously across states. One could argue that, to the extent that CPM re ‡ects the cost per percentage point of the markets'audience, fragmentation is not really a problem. To see why this could be argued, note that if the nine DMAs within Alabama were merged into one big DMA, then the CPM of this big DMA would approximately equal the sum of the nine smaller DMAs since, by construction, CPM accounts for the size of the population of its media market. Following this line of thinking, a possible measure of the cost of political advertising would be the sum of CPMs across all DMAs within a political district. Ansolabehere et al. (2001) took such an approach. However, one could posit the following concerns.
Consider the case of Alabama. As I said, there are nine DMAs that extend across this state. One of them is the expensive DMA of Atlanta, which spans over two counties in Alabama: Clebune and Randolph. Combined, these two counties comprise only 0.8 % of Alabama's population. Would political candidates running for an Alabama's seat pay the cost of advertising in the expensive Atlanta TV market just to reach a 0.8 % of Alabama's voters? Most likely not. The candidates would …nd it more cost-e¤ective to use the same money to purchase extra TV time in, say, the DMA of the Birmingham TV market, which spans over several counties that contain more than 39% of Alabama's population, at a cost that equals 20% of the cost of Atlanta. This example illustrates that, even when CPM adjusts for the population within its DMA market, a large part of the population within a DMA may correspond to a political district di¤erent than the one in which the candidate is running. To deal with this kind of problems, in their study of U.S. House races, Ansolabehere et al. (2001) considered, as additional measures of the cost of political advertising, the cost of reaching not the total of the voters, but a certain proportion, say 60%. However, this approach creates a new dilemma. Namely, how is this 60% obtained? One possibility is to start with the most inexpensive markets and move progressively to the most expensive ones. It seems to me that, although appealing from an economic perspective, this approach fails to take into account that, in reality, politicians tend to concentrate in a few media markets. These few media markets tend to be highly correlated with the most populated districts (which are usually not the most inexpensive ones). Moreover, there are good reasons to think that the most inexpensive media markets may correspond to the most "partisan" districts (i.e., the ones with a small proportion of issue-oriented voters relative to party-oriented voters) and are therefore the least appealing for issue-related advertising. (Such is the class of ads relevant to this study). Hence, a plausible alternative approach is to calculate the, say, 60 % of the state's population starting with the largest markets and move progressively to the smaller markets. This approach would capture the fact that Senate campaigns usually focus on the main city (or cities) of each state. Finally, irrespective of how I calculate this fraction of the population, some problems will still arise. To start with, the proportion of the population needs to be arbitrarily set. Why not 20, 40 or 80% instead of 60%? Furthermore, why even assume a constant percentage across states? The implications of a 60% threshold are not the same for, say, New York (where the population is highly concentrated in one TV market) as for, say, Alabama, where the population is widespread across the state. For instance, a 60% threshold uniform across states would imply that political candidates in New York devote all their attention to the most educated citizens of that state, while political candidates in Alabama devote most of their resources to second-, third-, and even fourth-tier counties in terms of the education level of their inhabitants. Since di¤erent degrees of education may be highly correlated with level of political partisanship and issue-oriented voting, this may play an important role in the analysis. For instance, it is likely that Alabama's candidates do not attempt to convince voters in low-density population areas with issue-oriented TV ads. Forcing the percentage of population to be constant across states would implicitly make the assumption that they do.
To bypass at least some of these problems, my approach consists of using the CPM of the DMA that spans the most populated county of a state as the measure of the cost of political advertising for that particular state. Then, for example, since Kings is the most populated county within the state of New York, and because the DMA market that spans over Kings is the New York DMA, I use the CPM that corresponds to the New York DMA as the measure of the cost of political advertising in the state of New York. Similarly, since the most populated county in Alabama is Je¤erson, and because the DMA that spans over Je¤erson is Birmingham, I use the CPM that corresponds to Birmingham as the cost measure for Alabama. Throughout, I refer to the construction of the cost of political advertising as the TV cost index.
I make clear that the TV cost index is not meant to be a valid measure in abstract, but in particular for the empirical implication of the theoretical model. First, this measure is not meant to summarize, in any way, the total cost of political advertising across states. Instead, it is meant to summarize one particular component of this total cost: the cost of reaching issue-oriented voters. As the literature suggests, political ads may or may not be issue-oriented, and the target population for each of these types of ads need not be the same. There are good reasons to think that issue-oriented ads are more likely to be aired on urban rather than rural areas. If, instead, I calculated the TV cost index as the sum across counties within a particular state, I would be implicitly assuming that a candidate running in, say, Missouri, has the same level of concern that his issue position would be misinterpreted in St. Louis county (liberal district, home of world-wide renowned universities) as he would in, say, Macon county (which has only 15,700 inhabitants). Second, this measure of TV cost index is not intended to summarize, in any way, the average measure of the CPM of the DMAs within each state, for similar reasons. Third, this measure of TV cost index does not intend to re ‡ect the degree of TV market fragmentation of each state. This is because (i) it is usually the case that campaigns focus on the most populated counties, and (ii) the degree of fragmentation of a particular state is likely to be only weakly correlated to the number of DMAs market within a state in which issue-oriented ads are aired. Fourth, ideally, in order to test the model, one would like to count with a measure of TV cost index that is a weighted sum of all DMAs within each state, where the weights would be given by some proxy for the degree to which: (i) the candidates may campaign in that particular market, and (ii) the degree to which the voters of that market are issue-oriented instead of party-oriented. However, it is not clear that such a measure would yield results signi…cantly di¤erent than the ones given by my measure of TV cost as the CPM of the most populated county. Also, the construction of this "ideal" measure, which is a very hard task, would rely on highly subjective procedures.
Previous studies have used di¤erent measures of the cost of political advertising. In particular, Campbell et al. (1984) and Stewart and Reynolds (1990) address the question of whether higher TV costs increase the incumbency advantage. These papers use measures (such as fragmentation) of how well political districts match media markets. Since, for their theoretical model, issue-oriented ads and non issue-oriented oriented ads may be considered substitutes, their measure of market is appropriate. The work of Ansolabehere et al. (2001) addresses the question of whether TV advertising prices are to blame for the increase in campaign expenditures in the last three decades. Accordingly, they calculate the cost of political advertising as the sum across DMAs within each state to reach (i) 1%, (ii) 50%, (iii) 66% and (iv) 100% of the state's population. The pros and cons of this approach have been discussed above. Note that the three papers use measures di¤erent than mine in order to address questions di¤erent than mine. For the sake of comparison, in addition to using the CPM of the most populated county as a proxy for the TV cost index of political advertising in issue-oriented districts, I also calculate an alternative measure, namely the sum of CPMs across the counties that sum up to certain percentages of the state's population. I discard the measures of political advertising that rely exclusively on the match between political districts and media markets because (i) Ansolabehere et al. (2001) …nd no strong correlation between these measures and actual costs, and (ii) as I already noted, accounting for market fragmentation may not be a good idea when measuring the cost of political advertising in districts where votes are primarily issue-oriented. Table 1 in Appendix E provides the summary statistics for the dependent variable and di¤erent versions of the TV cost index that will be used throughout.
The Model and Results

I estimate the probit model
Pr(N P AT = 1jCP P; X) = ( 0 + 1 CP P + X);
where ( ) denotes the standard Normal cumulative distribution function.
In this equation, the dependent variable NPAT may take two values: 0 represents F(ailed NPAT), and 1 represents P(assed NPAT), in the last election in which the candidate ran. The coe¢ cient of interest is 1 , which can be used to calculate the marginal e¤ect of TV cost index on the probability that N P AT = 1. My theory suggests that there must be a negative correlation between the TV cost index and the probability of announcing a position: the larger the cost of the PA technology (which allows the candidates to minimize the degree of ambiguity in the interpretation of their announcements), the more likely the candidates will not announce policy. As previously discussed, I measure the TV cost index for a given state as (the logarithm of) the CPP corresponding to the DMA that spans over the most populated county within that state. X is a set of the following control variables. Democratic Party is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the candidate represents the Democrat party and 0 otherwise. Incumbent is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the candidate is an incumbent in the election in which he is running, and 0 otherwise. Open seat is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the candidate is running for an open seat, and 0 otherwise . Year 2006 is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the candidate is running in the 2006 Senate election, and 0 otherwise. 30 Vote share democrats represents the vote share of the Democrats in the election in which the candidate is running in that particular race. This variable aims at capturing closeness between the candidates. Table 2 reports the coe¢ cient estimates. (The marginal e¤ects will be discussed later on.) As the theoretical model suggests, the TV cost index, which equals log(CP P ), exhibits a coe¢ cient of negative sign. This coe¢ cient is statistically signi…cant at the 5% level. Among the control variables, the only statistically signi…cant coe¢ cient is Democratic party. The regression shows, then, that the probability that a U.S. Senate candidate would make a clear stand on his platform decreases if the cost of TV advertising in his district rises or if the candidate is a Democrat. Before addressing point (i), which is of utmost relevance for us, let us make some comments regarding point (ii). Since Project Vote Smart is a non-partisan organization committed to political impartiality, one of its policies is that "[a]ll Founding Board members have an ideological opposite to provide balance and ensure strict impartiality." This implies that the ratio of Republicans to Democrats is close to one. However, because my empirical analysis is restricted to the U.S.A. Senate, a plausible concern is that, among PVS Founding Board members, there are actually more Republican than Democratic Senators. If this were the case, I might conclude that the lower probability of announcement conditional on the candidate representing the Democratic party could be the result of PVS members having more resources (contacts) to urge the political candidates to take the NPAT. Indeed, among the PVS Founding Board members, there are …ve Republican senators and only two Democratic senators. This suggests that the coe¢ cient of the covariate Democratic may be biased downward.
Of more importance is the coe¢ cient estimate of the TV cost index. This coe¢ cient is negative, statistically signi…cant at the 5% level and robust to minor modi…cations of the regression. To check the robustness, I proceed as follows. First, I regress the model, omitting each of the control variables one at a time, and no substantial changes occur. Second, I regress the model, omitting two variables and three variables at a time. Again, no substantial changes occur.
One could think of two alternative theories to explain why candidates may opt not to announce positions. A …rst plausible theory is that the candidates become more and more willing to announce positions as the race becomes closer and closer. This theory …nds no support in my estimation, since the coe¢ cient associated to vote share democrats is zero. A second plausible theory is that the candidates become more and more willing to announce positions as they run for seats in states with higher and higher levels of education. Although I did not include education level as a covariate in the analysis, I did check for median income by states, which should be highly correlated with education level. The result is that median income is negatively correlated to the probability of announcing position, which indicates that this theory also is not supported by the analysis. After observing the results in Table 2 , the negative coe¢ cient of median income should be no surprise, since median income and TV cost index are expected to be highly correlated (and they are: correlation is 0.64). I did not include median income in the regression reported in Table 2 since its negative sign provides strong evidence that median income (and, therefore, educational level) is not an omitted variable driving the results. (Of course, due to its collinearity with TV cost index, the standard deviation of the coe¢ cient associated with the latter variable is a¤ected when the two variables are included in the regression.)
In Table 2 , it can be observed that N = 129; this is because I drop the two observations corresponding to Alaska, since the DMAs are not assigned for some counties within this state. The fact that I do not aim to maximize explanatory power but to test a speci…c relation between two variables may explain the relatively low R 2 . A feature of probit models is that the omission of relevant variables tends to in ‡ate the standard deviations of the coe¢ cients even when the omitted variables are not correlated with the covariates (Cramer, 2003) . This suggests that signi…cance levels in Table  2 may be too conservative. This, together with the low R 2 , implies that in a fully speci…ed model, 1 may be signi…cant even at levels lower than 5%. Similar considerations follow from the small size of the sample.
To give an idea of the marginal e¤ect of the TV cost index on the probability of passing the NPAT test, consider two Senators running for a seat in the U.S. Senate: one from Alabama, which has a TV cost index of 110, and the other from Massachusetts, which has a TV cost index of 569. Assume that both represent the Republican party and are running for an open seat in the 2006 election. Also, assume the vote share of the Democratic party is the sample mean, 48%. From my regression, it follows that the probability of passing the NPAT is 14 percentage points higher for the candidate from Alabama than for the candidate from Massachusetts.
Alternative measures of the cost of political advertising
As I already discussed, the choice of a measure of the cost of political advertising may be debatable. In this section I consider a di¤erent measure, closer, but not identical, to the one used in Ansolabehere et al. (2001) . This measure de…nes the TV cost index as the sum, within each state, of as many DMAs as needed in order to reach a certain percentage of the state's population. From now on, I refer to this percentage of the population as the population threshold. My new measure of cost of political advertising equals the sum of the CPP of the DMAs that span over the most populated counties of the state, until the population threshold is reached. For example, suppose that the threshold is 30%. In the case of Alabama, the cost of reaching 30% of the population is equal to the cost of advertising in the DMAs of Birmingham, Mobile-Pensacola and Huntsville-Decatur, since, altogether, these three DMAs span over the 30% of Alabama's population, and they cover the most populated counties.
I consider several population thresholds in the range 1%-100%. In every case, the sign of the coe¢ cient of the TV cost index is negative, which is consistent with the empirical implication of the theoretical model. However, in general, as the population threshold increases, the p-value associated with this coe¢ cient increases. For small values, up to approximately 10%, I obtained results similar to when using the CPP of the DMAs that covers the most populated county within the state (that is, similar to the results reported in Table 2 ). For a threshold close to 15%, the level of signi…cance drops to 10%. For some value of the population threshold between 10% and 20%, the level of signi…cance drops to more than 10%, implying that I can no longer reject the null that 1 is equal to zero. As I move beyond the 20% population threshold, the p-value keeps increasing. Next, I provide my interpretation of this pattern.
As I already discussed, the empirical implication of the theoretical model is that candidates will be more likely to announce positions whenever they believe that issue-oriented voters are less likely to misinterpret their issue announcements. TV market fragmentation increases the cost of advertising because, in order to reach small towns or rural districts, the candidate needs to advertise in several DMAs in addition to the DMAs that cover the main cities of the state. Such an extra cost will be increasingly re ‡ected in the TV cost index as I set the population threshold higher and higher. It is important to note that, although such an extra cost re ‡ects the fact that the candidates reach more voters, the latter come from increasingly smaller, more rural areas, whose population is presumably less educated. In contrast, when the TV index is constructed so that only the DMA that covers the most populated county is considered, the e¤ect of market fragmentation and, therefore, of the voters that are more likely to cast their vote based on partisan considerations (vis à vis issue-position considerations), is minimized. This suggests that, when making strategic decisions like whether or not to announce positions, the candidates are sophisticated in the sense that their cost-bene…t analysis weights the districts within the state in order to account for their share of issue-oriented voters.
Conclusion
Previous impossibility results have found that, in a robust equilibrium, rational candidates will always prefer to make policy announcements. I developed a model with the novel feature that the voters receive a noisy signal of the announcements made by the candidates. Within this model, I investigated several di¤erent speci…cations of the model, namely: expected-utility candidates, ambiguity-averse candidates, two-candidate elections, multi-candidate elections, maximization of expected vote share and maximization of probability of victory.
In this model, the impossibility theorems are overcome. Moreover, this result is robust to any of the mentioned changes in the speci…cation of the model. The probability that the candidates do not announce in equilibrium depends on the distance between the mean of the voters'beliefs regarding the policy that a candidate who wins without announcement will implement and the ideal point of the median voter. As this distance decreases, the likelihood of robust non-salience is increased.
Finally, I estimated a probit model that supports a testable implication of the theoretical model. Ansolabehere et al. (2001) infer that the cost structure faced by the candidates has a substantive impact on the mediatic strategy of political campaigns. My empirical work shows that the impact of the cost structure goes even further, since it a¤ects key electoral strategies, such as whether or not to make clear stands on important issues. Irrespective of the speci…c form that takes, it follows that candidate 1's best response is Irrespective of the speci…c form that takes, it follows that candidate 1's best response is
Appendix
Case ( : Hence,
The FOC is 1 8 (1 d 2 d 1 ) = 0 and the SOC is 1 8 0:
Note that the FOC implies that 8.5 Appendix E: Summary Statistics The TV cost indexes correspond to 30 second ads reaching 1% of the markets'households.
